





(617) 627 – 3560
http://ase.tufts.edu/econIntertemporal Budget Policies and Macroeconomic
Adjustment in a Small Open Economy∗
Marcelo Bianconi￿ Walter H. Fisher￿
October 2003, Forthcoming, Journal of International Money and Finance
Abstract
This paper analyzes the role of nominal assets in ranking intertemporal budget
policies in a growing open economy. Budget policies are ranked in terms of the
public￿s intertemporal tax liability. In our small open economy model, the constraint
for the valuation of private and public ￿nancial assets is in terms of the exogenous
foreign price level. We show that this limits, under purchasing power parity, the
scope of the government to in￿uence the real value of ￿nancial assets using ￿scal
and monetary policy instruments.
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An enduring topic of economic policy is the study of the eﬀects of changes in ￿scal and
monetary instruments on the ￿nancial position of the public sector. Indeed, discussions in
the political arena often revolve around the question of the response of policy to current
￿scal de￿cits or surpluses. An oft-cited justi￿cation of tax cuts is that they pay￿at
least partially￿for themselves, since they also increase the level of economic activity and,
consequently, the tax base.1 This issue has been revisited recently as researchers have
applied the insights of endogenous growth theory to the relationship between ￿scal policy
decisions and the dynamic evolution of the government budget.2 The newer research,
exempli￿ed by Ireland (1994) and Bruce and Turnovsky (1999), considers the eﬀect of
government expenditure and tax policy not only on the growth rate of the economy, but
also on the growth rate of the tax base, the path of government debt, and the value
of future tax payments required to maintain the intertemporal solvency of the public
sector.3 Bianconi (1999) extends the work of Bruce and Turnovsky (1999) by introducing
nominal assets￿and hence an in￿ation tax￿into his analysis. He ￿nds that the existence
of nominal assets introduces another channel through which changes in ￿scal policy can
aﬀect the long-term tax liability of the private sector. Through the mechanisms of greater
in￿ation tax revenue and price level eﬀects that lower the burden of the public sector real
debt, Bianconi (1999) shows that changes in both government expenditure and tax policy
can reduce the long-run tax liability. He supports these analytical results with numerical
simulations that suggest that the role of nominal assets in determining future tax liabilities
1Early discussions of the supply-side impact of tax cuts focused on whether a reduction in the marginal
t a xr a t eo nl a b o ri n c o m ew o u l dl e a dt oa ni n c r e a s ei nt a xr e v e n u e st h r o u g hg r e a t e rw o r ke ﬀort. The
empirical consensus that emerged subsequently was that the response of labor supply to changes in the
after-tax real wage, at least in the United States, was too small to generate such Laﬀer-curve eﬀects. See
Laﬀer (1979) for an early statement of the potential supply-side eﬀects of tax reductions. More recently,
Slemrod (1994) found evidence that a Laﬀer curve eﬀect holds for high-income earners.
2Authors who analyzed the in￿uence of government expenditure and tax policy on the equilibrium
rate of growth include, among others, Barro (1990), Jones and Manuelli (1990), Rebelo (1991), and Jones,
Manuelli, and Rossi (1993).
3Bruce and Turnovsky (1999) also derive the conditions for the implementation of welfare-maximizing
￿scal policy. Agell and Persson (2001) also consider this question.While this is not our concern here, our
model can be employed to address this issue.
1may be of empirical relevance.
In this paper we extend this analysis to a small open economy that includes nominal
assets. We think this is an useful extension in light of the increasing integration of the
world economy and because rules enforcing public sector ￿nancial stability are becoming a
more important part of multilateral economic agreements, such as the Maastricht criterion
for European monetary integration. We develop a single-good, small open economy model
in which physical capital accumulation, as in Turnovsky (1996, 1997), is the engine of
economic growth. In addition to spending real resources, the government in our model
levies lump-sum and income taxes and issues internationally traded bonds and domestic
money balances. We consider the following policy experiments: (i) an increase in the
share of government expenditure in output; (ii) a cut in the capital tax rate, holding
the share of government expenditure constant; (iii) a balanced-budget cut in the capital
tax rate in which the share of government expenditure in output falls with the tax rate;
and (iv) a change in the rate of growth of nominal balances. We show that an increase
in the share of government expenditure￿in contrast to Bianconi (1999)￿cannot cause
a reduction in future tax liabilities, the so-called dynamic scoring result. Indeed, the
existence of nominal assets in the small open economy tends to magnify the increase in the
private sector￿s future tax liabilities subsequent to an increase in government expenditure.
In this case, dynamic scoring cannot take place because the public sector debt is, by
assumption, de￿ated by the exogenous foreign price level. The latter implies that the
value of government assets cannot be eroded through the higher domestic price level that
results from a ￿scal expansion. In other words, we provide a positive analysis of monetary
and ￿scal policy in the case of the ￿dollarization￿ of government debt.4
Dynamic scoring does take place in other situations, however. In particular, we derive
conditions in which dynamic scoring can occur subsequent to a reduction in capital taxes,
both holding the share of government expenditure constant and in the balanced budget
4We do, however, exclude the possibility of currency substitution in this model, which is in contrast
to the recent experience of Argentina. Recent analyses of ￿dollarization￿ are found in Calvo (2001) and
Yeyati and Sturzenneger (2001).
2case. As in the case of the government expenditure shock, the response of in￿ation tax
revenues is important in scaling the change in the future tax liability. If the response of
in￿ation tax revenues is suﬃciently ￿large￿, it can determine the direction of change in
the future tax liability. We show in our simulation exercise that while dynamic scoring
does not occur subsequent to a cut in capital taxes, given our choice of parameters, it does
take place in the case of a balanced-budget tax cut. In addition, we examine the impact
of increasing the rate of growth of nominal money balances. This policy does reduce,
through greater in￿ation tax revenues, the future tax liabilities of individuals, although
less than in the closed economy due the lack of price level eﬀects.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the private sector, its optimal
intertemporal choices and the growth equilibrium of the small open economy. Section
3s h o w st h ee ﬀect of ￿scal and monetary policy variables on the economy￿s equilibrium
growth rate, the initial levels of consumption and real money balances, and overall welfare.
Section 4, containing the major results of the paper, describes the conditions for dynamic
scoring. We simulate these results numerically in section 5. Section 6 brie￿y concludes.
2. The Model and Growth Equilibrium
The economy produces, consumes, and trades a single good with a ￿xed terms of trade
equal to unity, i.e., purchasing power parity (PPP) holds. This implies￿in percentage
terms￿the relationship p = p∗ + e,w h e r ep i st h ed o m e s t i cr a t eo fi n ￿ation, p∗ is the
exogenous foreign rate of in￿ation, and e is the rate of depreciation of the domestic in
terms of the foreign currency. The economy is ￿small￿ in terms of international ￿nancial
markets, since it takes as given the world nominal interest rate, which is linked to the
domestic nominal rate according to uncovered interest parity, i = i∗ + e,w h e r ei is the
domestic and i∗ is the world nominal interest rate. We model the private sector as a
representative consumer-producer, who solves the following maximization problem
Z =m a x
Z ∞
0
[logc + γ logm]e
−δtdt (1)
3subject to
œ m + œ b + {I [1 + (h/2)(I/K)]} =( 1− τ)αK +( i
∗ − p
∗)b − c − (p
∗ + e)m − T, (2a)
œ K = I, (2b)
and the initial conditions K(0) = K0 > 0, M(0) = M0 > 0, b(0) = b0 = B0/P∗
0 > 0. The
agent chooses ￿ow values of consumption c and investment I, the latter augmenting the
domestic physical capital, K. In addition, the small open economy accumulates domestic
real money balances, m = M/P, and real international bonds, b = B/P∗,w h e r eP is
the domestic price level, P∗ is the exogenous foreign price level, M is the nominal money
supply in terms of domestic currency, and B is the nominal stock of international bonds
in terms of foreign currency. The parameter δ > 0 is the exogenous consumer rate of
time preference, while τ ∈ [0,1] is the tax rate on physical capital, and T is the level
of lump-sum taxes imposed by the domestic government. The instantaneous logarithmic
utility function in (1) implies that consumption and real balances have an intertemporal
elasticity of substitution equal to unity and that the parameter γ > 0 weighs the utility
services of money.5 Domestic physical capital accumulation (ignoring depreciation) is
subject, following Hayashi (1982), to a standard quadratic representation of the convex
costs of installing physical capital, where the parameter h>0m e a s u r e st h e￿ s l o p e ￿
of the marginal cost of investing an additional unit of output. Individuals have access
to a linear production function Y = αK, α > 0, where Y represents domestic output.
As in Rebelo (1991), Bruce and Turnovsky (1999), and Bianconi (1999), the level of
employment is exogenous. This permits us to concentrate on the intertemporal growth
eﬀects of government policy, rather on the static eﬀects, which depend largely on the
changes in the level of work eﬀort.
The necessary ￿rst order conditions for consumption, investment, real balances, foreign
5Fisher and Bianconi (2001) provide additional mathematical detail. The speci￿cation of instantaneous
utility and adjustment costs follows Bianconi (1999).




































where λ is the costate variable associated with the constraint (2a) and represents the
shadow value of ￿nancial wealth, q0 ≡ qλ is the shadow value, in terms of ￿nancial wealth,
of the domestic capital stock, and φ denotes the growth rate of the capital stock (and
output). The following transversality conditions for, respectively, b, m,a n dK also hold:
limt→∞ λbe−δt = limt→∞ λme−δt = limt→∞ qλKe−δt = 0. Equation (3a) states that the
marginal utility of consumption equals the shadow value of wealth, λ, while (3b) equates
the marginal cost of investment to its shadow value, q. Equation (3c) illustrates the rate
of return conditions for real money balances and bonds in terms of the rate of return of
consumption, the latter equal to (δ − œ λ/λ). From equation (3d), this also corresponds to
the after-tax rate of return of physical capital.
We now introduce a domestic public sector that issues internationally traded bonds
(which are perfect substitutes for internationally traded assets) and domestic money bal-
ances to cover the ￿ow diﬀerence between real expenditures, interest service, and aggregate
tax revenues. The latter consists of lump-sum taxes, revenues from the capital income tax,
and the in￿ation tax.6 In this framework the role of government expenditure is simply to
withdraw resources from the private sector. This implies the following public sector ￿ow
budget constraint
œ a + œ m = G +( i
∗ − p
∗)a − T − ταK − (p
∗ + e)m, (4)
6In order enhance the clarity of our results, we restrict ourselves to these two distortionary taxes. It
is, nevertheless, straightforward to incorporate consumption and interest income taxes.
5where G is real government expenditure and a is the real stock of internationally traded
domestic government bonds, where (i∗ − p∗)a represents real interest service. We also
assume that government bonds evolve from a given initial value a(0) = a0 = A0/P ∗
0 > 0,
where A is the nominal stock of government bonds in terms of foreign currency, and
that the evolution of government debt is subject to the following transversality condition:
limt→∞ λae−δt = 0. We assume that the government sets a constant growth rate of
nominal balances, where σ = œ M/M is the growth rate of the nominal money supply.
Hence, the accumulation of real money balances is:
œ m =( σ − p)m =( σ − p
∗ − e)m. (5)
Following Bianconi (1999), we specify that both government expenditure and lump-sum
taxes are set proportional to output. In the case of government expenditure, this rela-
tionship corresponds to G(t)=ﬂ gαK,w h e r eﬂ g is a constant policy parameter, while in the
case of lump-sum taxes, the proportion ﬂ T(t) varies according to ﬂ T(t)=T(t)/αK.
To derive the ￿ow equation for the current account balance, we substitute the public
sector constraint (4) into private sector constraint (2a) and let n ≡ b − a denote the real
net credit position of the small open economy. This yields:
œ n =( 1− ﬂ g)αK − c − I [1 + (h/2)(I/K)] + (i
∗ − p
∗)n. (6)
This relationship corresponds to the current account balance, which equals output net of
government expenditure, plus net interest income, less private expenditures on consump-
tion and capital formation. For expositional purposes, we will assume that the economy
inherits a positive stock of initial credit, n(0) = n0 = b0 − a0 > 0. Finally, the open
economy is subject to the following intertemporal solvency condition: limt→∞ λne−δt =0 .
Next, to solve for the growth rate of consumption, we take the time diﬀerential of (3a)








∗) − δ = ψ ⇒ c(t)=c(0)e
ψt, λ(t)=λ(0)e
−ψt, (7)
where ψ denotes the constant growth rate of consumption. Equation (7) is the standard
Euler relationship, where the initial values c(0) and λ(0) are determined below. To ￿nd the
equilibrium growth rate of the capital stock, we must determine the equilibrium behavior
of q. Rewriting (3d), we obtain the following non-linear diﬀerential equation for q:
œ q =( i
∗ − p




In order to obtain an equilibrium with a constant growth rate of physical capital, the
solution for the quadratic equation œ q = 0 must have at least one real root. Using standard
methods, it is straightforward to show that the steady-state shadow value of capital






where ∆ =2 h[(i∗−p∗)−α(1−τ)]+h2(i∗−p∗)2.7 Consequently, neither the capital stock
nor its shadow value display transitional dynamics. From (3b), the equilibrium growth
rate of capital then equals φ =( q − 1)/h,w h e r eq is given by (8b). Note that growth
is positive as long as the world real interest rate does not exceed the after-tax marginal
product of capital, i.e., q>1 ⇔ (i∗ − p∗) < α(1 − τ).
Next, we calculate the equilibrium path of the real stock of international credit. To
do so, we substitute, using equation (3b), the expressions for investment and physical
capital, the path of consumption (7), and i∗ − p∗ = ψ + δ into (6). This yields
œ n =( ψ + δ)n + ζK0e
φt − c(0)e
ψt, (9a)
7The mathematical background for this result is available from the authors on request.
7where
ζ =( 1− ﬂ g)α −
(q2 − 1)
2h
= q(ψ + δ − φ) − (ﬂ g − τ)α, (9b)
and where the second equality in (9b) uses the expression for œ q = 0 from (8a). Integrating
(9a), substituting for λ(t)=λ(0)e−ψt, and applying the intertemporal solvency condition










ψ + δ − φ
e
φt, (10a)
where (ψ + δ − φ) > 0 and:
c(0) = λ




ψ + δ − φ
!
. (10b)
Using the solution (8b) for q,w ec a nc o n ￿rm (ψ + δ − φ) > 0. Equation (10b), in turn,
pins-down the initial level of consumption. Observe that the path of net credit￿unlike
that of consumption and physical capital￿displays transitional dynamics, since it is a
function of both ψ and φ. Nevertheless, the growth rate of net credit, œ n/n,c o n v e r g e si n
the asymptotic limit to max[ψ,φ].
We next derive the equilibrium path of real money balances, m(t). To calculate
this expression, we combine (5) with the optimality conditions (3a, c), substitute for
c(t)=c(0)eψt, and use œ λ/λ = −ψ. This yields the equation describing the evolution of
m(t):
œ m =( ψ + δ + σ)m − γc(0)e
ψt. (11a)
Integrating this expression and imposing the transversality condition for m(t), we obtain












where m(0) = γc(0)/(σ + δ). The latter relationship implies that the initial stock of real
money balances is proportional to the initial level of consumption and that both grow at
8t h ec o m m o nr a t eo fψ.S i n c e m(0) = M0/P (0), the expression for initial real balances
determines P(0), the initial domestic price level, and E(0) = P(0)/P ∗
0, the initial nominal
exchange rate. Under PPP, this implies that any shift in the domestic price level leads
to a proportionately identical shift in the nominal exchange rate. Since nominal ￿nancial
assets are de￿ated by the exogenous foreign price level, their real values are insulated
from variations in the domestic price level and nominal exchange rate.8
Finally, employing our logarithmic parameterization and substituting equations (7),




n0 + qK0 −
(ﬂ g − τ)αK0








This expression reveals that consumer welfare depends on: (i) the government￿s ￿scal and
monetary policy variables, {ﬂ g,τ,σ}; (ii) the two equilibrium growth rates, (ψ,φ); (iii)
the inherited stocks of net credit and physical capital, (n0,K 0); and (iv) ￿fundamental￿
parameters such as the rate of time preference, the utility weight on real money balances,
and the marginal physical product of capital, {δ,γ,α}.
3. The Eﬀects of Policy on the Growth Equilibrium
Considering ￿rst the impact of a change in the proportion of output devoted to government
spending, ﬂ g, we calculate the following comparative static expressions, using equations
























8Using equation (5), the solution (11b) for m(t) determines the equilibrium rate of depreciation e,
since œ m/m = ψ = σ−p∗−e.T h i sa l s o￿xes the equilibrium rate of domestic in￿ation, p = p∗+e = σ−ψ.
9While an increase in ﬂ g leaves the two open economy growth rates unchanged, it lowers,
through the resource-withdrawal eﬀect, the initial levels of consumption and real money
balances. We next consider the eﬀects of a change in the capital or income tax rate, τ.
















δ(ﬂ g − τ)h−1α2K0









From equations (14a, b) it is clear that while a cut in the tax rate τ does not aﬀect ψ and,
thus, does not in￿uence the growth rate of c and m, it does increase the shadow value of
domestic capital and, consequently, raise the growth rate of output.9 In addition, whether
a decrease in the capital tax raises or lowers consumption and real money balances depends
on sgn (ﬂ g − τ). If (ﬂ g − τ) > 0, then a cut in τ lowers initial consumption and real money
demand, while the opposite is the case if (ﬂ g−τ) < 0. Because government spending is tied
to output, a tax cut that raises φ also increases the growth rate of government spending.
If (ﬂ g − τ) > 0, the latter then crowds-out consumption through the resource-withdrawal
eﬀect. The opposite is true if (ﬂ g − τ) < 0, since the tax cut in this case results, on net,


























Consistent with the classical dichotomy, an increase in the growth rate of nominal balances
lowers the demand for real money balances, but does not aﬀect the equilibrium growth
rates ψ and φ and the initial level of consumption c(0). Given the economy￿s interest rate
9To derive the expression for ∂q/∂τ in (14a), we employed the expression for q in (8b) to calculate
∂q/∂τ = −hα∆−1/2. We then used the fact that ψ + δ − φ = h−1∆1/2 to obtain ∂q/∂τ.
10and purchasing power parity relationships, equation (15b) shows that a rise in σ leads to
a one-for-one increase in the rates of depreciation and domestic in￿ation.
We complete this section by considering the impact of these policy changes on overall























where the expressions for ∂c(0)/∂ﬂ g and ∂c(0)/∂τ are given, respectively, by equations
(13b) and (14b). Whether Z rises or falls in response to changes in ﬂ g and τ, depends on
whether initial consumption rises or falls. Thus, an increase in ﬂ g lowers overall welfare,
since it also lowers initial consumption. In contrast, a cut in τ raises overall welfare if it
increases initial consumption, which is the case if (ﬂ g − τ) < 0. Finally, since an increase
in the rate of growth of nominal balances lowers real money demand, a rise in σ lowers
Z. Observe that the size of the response of Z in all three policy experiments is scaled
by parameter γ,w h i c hr e ￿ects the role of real money balances in generating utility and
overall welfare. In section 5 we simulate numerically the impact of these policies on Z.
4. Intertemporal Government Budget Constraint
We ￿rst determine the public sector￿s intertemporal budget constraint. This is derived by
substituting [G(t) − T(t)] = [ﬂ g− ﬂ T(t)]αK(t), K(t)=K0eφt, œ m = ψm and the equilibrium
conditions (7) and (11b) into the government budget constraint (4). We then obtain






where c(0) is given by equation (10b). Integration of (17a), imposition of the public sector
solvency condition and the substitution of λ(t)=λ(0)e−ψt and ﬂ T(t)=[ T(t)/αK0]e−φt,







(ﬂ g − τ)αK0







Moreover, the intertemporal solvency of the public sector implies a path of lump-sum





−(ψ+δ)tdt = a0 +
(ﬂ g − τ)αK0





We de￿ne V (T) as the present discounted value of future lump-sum taxes that is required
to maintain public sector solvency. Following Bruce and Turnovsky (1999) and Bianconi
(1999), we interpret V (T) as a measure of the ￿sustainability￿ of any combination of ￿scal
and monetary policies described by {ﬂ g,τ,σ}. This means that a shift in {ﬂ g,τ,σ} must be
accompanied by a shift in V (T) in order to sustain public sector solvency. Observe, in
addition, that we can identify the last two terms on the right-hand-side of (17c) with the
primary de￿cit of the public sector. We next consider how changes in ￿scal and monetary
policy aﬀect the value of V (T). Subsequently, we analyze the public policies that insure
long-run government solvency.
Using our expression for V (T), we calculate the impact of changes in the fraction of
output absorbed by the government, ﬂ g, the tax rate on capital income, τ, and the growth
rate of nominal money balances, σ, on the aggregate tax liability of the private sector.

















ψ + δ − φ
> 0. (18)
This expression reveals that an increase in ﬂ g unambiguously raises the future tax burden
of the private sector. This is due to the direct eﬀect of an increase in ﬂ g on the primary
￿scal de￿cit and because the rise in ﬂ g causes, through the resource-withdrawal eﬀect, a
decline in consumption and real money demand, which, in turn, lowers the in￿ation tax
base. In this context, observe that the rise in V (T) depends positively on the size of the
12preference parameter γ. Clearly, then, the larger are the utility services of money, the
more a rise in ﬂ g increases the future tax burden. The existence of nominal assets serves in
this framework to magnify the impact of a ￿scal expansion on the private sector￿s future
tax liabilities. This is in contrast to the closed economy result of Bianconi (1999) in which
a dynamic scoring result is possible, due to a suﬃciently large fall in the burden of real
public debt. The reason why dynamic scoring does not occur in this small open economy
model is because the nominal value government debt is de￿ated by the exogenous foreign
price level and not by its domestic counterpart. Consequently, the increase in the domestic
price level that occurs to maintain money market equilibrium does not aﬀect the real value
of government debt.10 Future private sector tax liabilities are, thus, unaﬀected through
this channel. This is also the case in our subsequent examples.
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+
(ﬂ g − τ)αK0
















¸ (ﬂ g − τ)h−1α2K0
(ψ + δ − φ)3 , (19)
where we have substituted the expressions for [∂φ/∂τ]a n d[ ∂c(0)/∂τ] from equations (14a,
b) to derive the second equality in (19). Examination of the ￿rst equality of equation
(19) shows that the impact of a decrease in the capital tax can be broken-down into
three parts. The ￿rst term in this expression describes the direct positive eﬀect of a
cut in τ on the primary de￿cit, which acts to raise the tax liability V (T). The next
term in this equality describes the eﬀects on V (T)t h a ta r i s ef r o mah i g h e rg r o w t hr a t e
φ. We observe that it has ambiguous eﬀect on future liabilities, since it depends on sgn
(ﬂ g − τ). If (ﬂ g − τ) > 0, the tax liability then rises, because the accompanying increase
in government expenditure￿recall that it is tied to the growth rate of physical capital
and output￿swamps the increase in the tax base due to the higher growth rate φ.T h e
10Using the expressions for P(0) and E(0) given above, the increases in the initial domestic price level
and exchange rate equal: [∂P(0)/∂ﬂ g]=[ ∂E(0)/∂ﬂ g]=−[P(0)/γc(0)]•[∂c(0)/∂ﬂ g] > 0. Consequently, PPP
insulates the small open economy terms of trade from the shock to ﬂ g.
13opposite is true if (ﬂ g − τ) < 0. In this case the increase in the tax base overwhelms the
rise in government expenditure and tends to lower V (T). Indeed, if this latter eﬀect is
suﬃciently strong, then dynamic scoring is possible.11 The third term in the ￿rst equality
of (19) describes the in￿uence of changes in the in￿ation tax on the tax liability. Its
sign depends on whether initial consumption rises or falls subsequent to the cut in τ.
If c(0) rises, the case if (ﬂ g − τ) < 0, then real money holdings also increase, which, in
turn, increases in￿ation tax revenue and tends to reduce the tax liability. The opposite
holds if c(0) falls, which is true if (ﬂ g − τ) > 0. Here, real money demand declines and,
consequently, so does in￿ation tax revenue. If the former increase in in￿ation tax revenues
is suﬃciently large, then a cut in τ can also lower the future tax liability through this
channel. These considerations lead to the following proposition.
Proposition 1: Dynamic Scoring and Reductions in the Capital Tax
(a) As u ﬃcient condition for a cut in τ to increase future tax liabilities is (ﬂ g − τ) > 0:
∂V (T)
∂τ
< 0 ⇔ (ﬂ g − τ) > 0. (20a)
(b) In the case (ﬂ g − τ) < 0,as u ﬃcient condition for a cut in τ to reduce future tax








¸ (ﬂ g − τ)




The proof of part (a) is obvious from our discussion above, since (19) is unambiguously
negative if (ﬂ g − τ) > 0. Part (b) is derived using the second equality of (19), after
substituting for [∂φ/∂τ]a n d￿nding the condition for [∂V (T)/∂τ] > 0i f( ﬂ g − τ) < 0.
In section 5 we simulate the model numerically to determine whether condition (20b) is
satis￿ed for a plausible set of parameter values.
We next calculate the impact of a balanced-budget tax cut on the value of future tax
11Unlike in Bruce and Turnovsky (1999), dynamic scoring can take place in our model even though the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution is unity.
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¸ (ﬂ g − τ)h−1α2K0
(ψ + δ − φ)
3 , (21)
where we have substituted for [∂φ/∂τ]|dτ=d¯ g,[ ∂c(0)/∂ﬂ g]|dτ=d¯ g from (14a, b) to obtain the
second equality in (21). Comparing equations (21) and (19), we observe that since fraction
ﬂ g falls with τ in the balanced-budget case, the direct positive eﬀect of a tax cut on the
primary de￿cit washes-out. This implies that the balanced-budget tax cut in￿uences
future tax liabilities only through its eﬀect on the growth rate and in￿ation tax revenues.
Nevertheless, since the growth rate φ, according to (13a), is independent of ﬂ g,t h i st e r m
has the same (ambiguous) impact on future tax liabilities as in the previous case in which
ﬂ g is held constant. On the other hand, a balanced-budget tax cut has a distinct impact
on consumption and real money demand, since the reduction in ﬂ g ￿crowds-in￿ c(0) and
m(0), which acts to increase in￿ation tax revenue. If the latter eﬀect is suﬃciently large,
then dynamic scoring can take place even if (ﬂ g − τ) > 0. Given these considerations, we
state the next proposition.
Proposition 2: Dynamic Scoring and Balanced-Budget Reductions in the Cap-
ital Tax
(a) The case (ﬂ g − τ) > 0 is not a suﬃcient condition for a balanced-budget tax cut to










(ﬂ g − τ)




(b) As u ﬃcient condition for a balanced-budget tax cut to reduce future tax liabilities
is (ﬂ g − τ) < 0:
∂V (T)
∂τ
|dτ=d¯ g > 0 ⇔ (ﬂ g − τ) < 0. (22b)
The proof of part (a) is determined using the second equality of (21), after substituting
15for [∂φ/∂τ] and solving for [∂V (T)/∂τ]|dτ=d¯ g > 0i f( ﬂ g − τ) > 0. The proof of part (b) is
obvious, since the expression (21) is unambiguously positive if (ﬂ g − τ) < 0.
T u r n i n gt om o n e t a r yp o l i c y ,ac h a n g ei nσ results in the following adjustment in the






2 < 0. (23)
This implies that an increase in the rate of growth of nominal balances, as in the closed
economy model of Bianconi (1999), raises in￿ation tax revenues and reduces the tax
liability V (T). This, of course, also means that dynamic scoring cannot take place after
a cut in σ. The impact on future tax liabilities in (23) is precisely one-half of that
calculated by Bianconi (1999). This re￿ects, as before, the fact that the accompanying
rise in the domestic price level does not lower the value of public sector liabilities. Due
to the classical dichotomy, there is, moreover, no dynamic feedback on the ￿real-side￿ of
the economy and, thus, on capital tax revenues.
We indicated above that the intertemporal solvency of the public sector is a function of
the present discounted value of the tax liability V (T). Another, more stringent, criterion
for intertemporal solvency is that the private sector￿s future tax liability equals zero,
V (T)=0 . 12 In terms of (17c), this criterion implies
a0 +
(ﬂ g − τ)αK0
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w h e r ew eh a v es u b s t i t u t e df o rc(0) to derive the second equality of (24). To maintain
long-run ￿scal solvency, one of the three policy tools {ﬂ g,τ,σ} is chosen to satisfy (24).
Using (24), we obtain the following expressions for {ﬂ g,τ,σ} under this constraint

















12According to Bruce and Turnovsky (1999), V (T) = 0 is ￿sustainable￿ in the sense that no further
policy shifts need be taken to maintain public sector intertemporal solvency.


















−δ[(ψ + δ − φ)a0 +(ﬂ g − τ)αK0]
(ψ + δ − φ)[a0 − γ (n0 + qK0)] + (1 + γ)(ﬂ g − τ)αK0
, (25c)
where the other two policy tools are chosen freely. We use these expressions in section 5
to simulate the welfare implications of maintaining public sector solvency using the policy
instruments (25a￿c).
5. Numerical Simulations
In order to assess the impact of alternative policies, consistent with intertemporal solvency,
on the tax liabilities and welfare of the private sector, we resort to a simple numerical
simulation of the model. The benchmark set of parameter values is given at the bottom
of Table 1 and is plausible one, since it implies positive values for ψ and φ, and because
the tax rate exceeds the fraction of government spending in output, (ﬂ g −τ) < 0. Applied
to the model, the parameters imply a common, equilibrium endogenous growth rate of
2%, i.e., ψ = φ. Additionally, the consumption share is about 53% of output, the initial
stock of government debt is 50% of output with the net foreign asset position positive
and equal to 5% of output. We further assume that foreign nominal interest rate equals
10%, the foreign in￿ation is 4%, and, thus, that the foreign real interest rate is 6%. This
parameterization implies lump-sum tax credits, or transfers, on the order of 97% of output
to guarantee long-run intertemporal solvency. Finally, we specify that the fraction ﬂ T is
constant in the benchmark parameterization.
T a b l e1s u m m a r i z e st h ee ﬀects of arbitrary marginal cuts in each of the policy in-
struments, {ﬂ g,τ,σ}.T h e￿rst column of Table 1 denotes the change in the tax liability
V (T) relative to the benchmark of the constant ﬂ T policy. The second and third columns
illustrate, respectively, the change in welfare, Z, in the constant ﬂ T case and change in
welfare, Z|LC, in the case in which the long-run constraint (24) binds. The expressions
for the changes in welfare are evaluated using equation (12). A reduction in ﬂ g results in
17a5 8 .8% welfare gain in the constant ﬂ T case. In contrast, welfare falls by 47.6% if, in-
stead, government spending is endogenously increased to achieve long-run ￿scal solvency.
Long-run solvency is satis￿ed here by increasing government spending, because the initial
equilibrium is one in which private sector receives positive transfers. A cut in government
spending decreases the tax liability of the private sector by 130.7% in the constant ﬂ T
policy. On the other hand, a cut in the capital income tax yields a much smaller welfare
gain, about 5.2%, and results in an increase in the lump sum tax liability of 88.2%. Con-
sequently, a policy of simultaneously cutting government spending and the tax rate yields
a welfare gain of 64% and a decrease in the tax liability of 42.5%, as we should expect
from Proposition 2, since (ﬂ g − τ) < 0. With respect to the capital tax rate, long-run
solvency is achieved with a cut in τ, because the initial equilibrium is one in which the
agents receive lump-sum tax credits. If τ is cut to satisfy V (T) = 0, welfare rises by
13.3%. The de￿ationary policy￿corresponding to a reduction in σ￿leads to very small
increases in welfare and tax liabilities compared to the other two policy instruments in
the constant ﬂ T case. However, a de￿ationary policy that satis￿es (24) turns the in￿ation
tax into a subsidy, which, as in Bianconi (1999), yields more signi￿cant welfare gains.
One key issue is the absence of dynamic scoring in the case of a decrease in the capital
income tax rate, holding ﬂ g constant. In order to satisfy the condition (20b) of Proposition
1, we must choose an implausible parameterization of the model, especially in terms of
the diﬀerence in the growth rates, (ψ − φ). This suggests that the opportunities for
dynamic scoring in the case of the small open economy are limited. Indeed, even in the
closed economy model of Bianconi (1999), a relatively ￿large￿ rate of time preference δ
compared to the rate of nominal money growth σ is required for dynamic scoring￿brought
about by the in￿ation tax and price level eﬀects￿to occur. As we have seen, however,
the price level eﬀect is fully absorbed by movements in the nominal exchange rate in
our small open economy model, making this channel ineﬀective and these parameters less
important. Here, the adjustment cost parameter, h, and the foreign interest and in￿ation
rates, i∗ and p∗, play key roles in determining the discrepancy (ψ−φ) in the growth rates.
Due, however, to nonlinearities in the equilibrium, we are unable to ￿nd a reasonable
18combination of parameters that results in dynamic scoring for a plausible diﬀerence in
the growth rates. Nevertheless, if the alternative policy of simultaneous cuts in ﬂ g and τ
is enacted￿recall from Proposition 2 that a suﬃcient condition for dynamic scoring is
(ﬂ g − τ) < 0￿we observe in Table 1 that it takes place.
To sum-up, a balanced-budget tax cut provides a welfare gain and reduction in tax
liabilities in our framework. This is the most attractive of our policy options, since it
attains both objectives￿greater welfare and lower tax liabilities￿simultaneously. Cutting
government spending alone has a similar eﬀect, but cutting tax rates (both on capital
and on money balances) cannot yield both objectives at once. The in￿ation tax eﬀects
are quantitatively small due to the denomination of domestic ￿nancial assets in foreign
currency.
6. Concluding Remarks
In this paper we analyze the eﬀects of ￿scal and monetary policies on the long-run tax
liability of the private sector in a small open economy model with nominal assets. Among
our major results, we ￿nd that a rise in the fraction of output devoted to government ex-
penditure unambiguously increases the future tax liabilities of the private sector, without
any possibility of ￿dynamic scoring.￿ In addition, we investigate the conditions in which
a tax cut results in dynamic scoring, i.e., a reduction in the long-run tax burden. A key
factor in the determination of our theoretical ￿ndings is the response of the in￿ation tax
base to the shift in ￿scal policy. The existence of nominal assets can either magnify the
eﬀect of the change in ￿scal policy, as in the case of a government expenditure shock, or,
as in the case of a tax cut, it can oﬀset the positive impact of the tax cut on the primary
de￿cit and lead to lower intertemporal tax burdens. Our simulation results suggest that
while dynamic scoring does not take place if the capital tax alone is reduced, it can occur
in the balanced-budget case. The one component of the long-run tax burden that the
policy authorities cannot alter is, however, the real value of public sector debt, which is
determined by the exogenous foreign price level under PPP. This factor limits the ability
19of the government to manipulate intertemporal tax burdens in small open economies.
One of our main results, that monetary and ￿scal policy cannot alter the real value of
government debt, depends upon the assumption that in the small open economy domestic
government debt is completely denominated in terms of foreign currency. Consequently,
price level eﬀects that alter the real value of public debt in response to monetary and
￿scal policy cannot occur. In contrast, we provide a positive analysis of the eﬀects of
monetary and ￿scal policies when there is, in eﬀect, ￿dollarization￿ of government debt.
Our results represent, then, a useful benchmark for an analysis of the bene￿ts and costs of
dollarization.13 The assumption that government debt is denominated wholly in terms of
foreign currency can, of course, be relaxed by specifying that some exogenous proportion
of domestic debt is denominated in domestic currency. In this case, monetary and ￿scal
policy has distinct impacts on the holders of domestic currency denominated debt, [i.e.,
the price level eﬀects described in Bianconi (1999)], and on the holders of foreign currency
denominated debt, as we analyze here. The exogenous constraint on the various denom-
inations of debt holdings implies that arbitrage is unable to eliminate this distinction.
A political economy model is, in eﬀect, needed to endogenously determine the extent to
which a government can constrain the proportion of debt denominated in foreign currency.
We believe this is a fruitful avenue for future research.
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22TABLE 1
TAX LIABILITIES AND THE WELFARE GAINS/COSTS OF BUDGET
POLICIES IN SMALL OPEN ECONOMY
V (T) ZZ |LC
A. Constant ﬂ T Policy
∂ﬂ g|¯ Tconstant < 0, ﬂ g =0 .20 −130.75 8 .8￿
∂τ|¯ Tconstant < 0, τ =0 .25 88.25 .2￿
∂σ| ¯ Tconstant < 0, σ =0 .04 0.30 .2￿
∂ﬂ g|¯ Tconstant < 0, ∂τ|¯ Tconstant < 0, ﬂ g =0 .20,τ =0 .25 −42.56 4 .0￿
B. Long-Run Constraint
∂ﬂ g|LC > 0 ￿￿ −47.6a
∂τ|LC < 0 ￿￿ 1 3 .3a
∂σ|LC < 0 ￿￿ 2 9 .5a
Notes: The ￿rst two columns represent the percentage changes in V (T)a n dZ.
aThese refer to the endogenous choices of {ﬂ g,τ,σ} required to satisfy (25a￿c), and
indicate percentage changes in welfare, Z|LC, if the long-run ￿s c a lc o n s t r a i n t( 2 4 )i si m -
posed.
The benchmark set of parameter values is: h =1 0 ;δ =0 .04; α =0 .1; τ =0 .30;
ﬂ g =0 .25; γ =0 .025; σ =0 .04125; K0 =1 0( s ot h a tαK0 =1 ) ;M0 =0 .16; b0 =0 .50;
i∗ =0 .10; p∗ =0 .04; a0 =0 .45; n0 =0 .05. Also, the implied value of q is 1.2 > 1.
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